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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 










CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF THE 
ARCHDIOCESE OF PHILADELPHIA;  
DON GUANELLA VILLAGE                          
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-09-cv-01887) 
District Judge: Honorable R. Barclay Surrick 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 10, 2011 
 
Before:  RENDELL, AMBRO and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  March 2, 2011)                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
Barry Keyes appeals the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s 
grant of summary judgment to Don Guanella Village (“Don Guanella”) on plaintiff’s 
claim that he was discriminated against because of his sleep apnea in violation of the 
 2 
 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act 
(“PHRA”).1  
The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the District Court’s final order.   
As we write solely for the parties, we recite only the facts relevant to our analysis.  
Don Guanella is a residential facility located in Springfield, Pennsylvania that houses a 
school for teenage boys suffering from mental retardation and other special needs and a 
center for developmentally disabled adult men.  Keyes was employed by Don Guanella as 
a full-time registered nurse from October 2005 to September 2007.  Soon after he was 
hired, he began coming to work late on a consistent basis.  He informed Carol Thomas, 
the Director of Nursing, that he was having difficulty sleeping and that he suspected he 
had sleep apnea.  In a series of meetings during January and February of 2007 with 
Frances Hagarty, the chief administrator of Don Guanella, and Thomas, Keyes received 
warnings and a two-day suspension due to his pattern of tardiness.  During these 
discussions, Keyes again informed his supervisors that he was having trouble sleeping 
and suspected he had sleep apnea, but he did not request any type of accommodation for 
                                              
1
 Plaintiff originally filed this lawsuit against Catholic Charities of the 
Archdiocese of Philadelphia and Don Guanella Village.  However, in his response to 







  By buying a second alarm clock and having his wife wake him up, he was 
able to start arriving at work on time. 
In September 2007, Keyes was involved in a verbal confrontation with another 
nurse whom he believed had abandoned her assignment.  After the dispute, Keyes called 
Thomas and threatened to resign if he had to work with the same nurse again.  He later 
sent Thomas a letter explaining that he had been experiencing symptoms of fatigue and 
had scheduled a sleep study.
3
  Within a few days, Hagarty and Thomas scheduled a 
meeting with plaintiff to discuss the dispute he had with his co-worker.  At the meeting, 
they asked Keyes if he needed time off to deal with his sleep apnea issues, but he 
declined.
4
  Keyes then told his supervisors that his heart and soul were not in his job 
anymore.  The next day, Hagarty called Keyes to inform him that, in light of the 
discussion the previous day, it was no longer in Don Guanella’s best interest to employ 
Keyes at the facility.   
                                              
2
 Keyes testified that his sleep apnea, though it caused him high blood pressure 
and daytime fatigue and interfered with his ability to do household chores, did not affect 
his ability to perform his duties as a registered nurse.  Thus, he never requested or felt 
that he needed reasonable accommodation in order to work.   
 
3
 A factual dispute exists as to whether Keyes told his supervisors he suffered from 
sleep issues and suspected he had sleep apnea.  Thomas and Hagarty deny that they knew 
about this issue, but Keyes insists he told them about it on multiple occasions.  Because 
we view all facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff in reviewing a motion for 
summary judgment, we, as the District Court did, assume that defendants were aware of 
Keyes’s sleep problems and his suspicion that he suffered from sleep apnea.   
 
4
 Keyes testified that after he mentioned his sleep apnea, the tone of the 
conversation changed and his employers’ non-verbal signals indicated that they were 
going to terminate him. 
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Keyes testified that he started to experience symptoms of sleep apnea, the 
condition he claims was responsible for his termination,
5
 around September 2005.  He 
first sought medical care six months later in March 2006 with Dr. David Schwartz, an 
ear, nose and throat doctor.  Dr. Schwartz recommended that Keyes schedule a sleep 
study but did not diagnose him with sleep apnea at this time.  Keyes finally followed up 
on this advice in October 2007 – after his employment with Don Guanella had been 
terminated – by undergoing a sleep study with Dr. Gregory Breen.  Dr. Breen diagnosed 
Keyes with sleep apnea and recommended that he use a CPAP (continuous positive 
airway pressure) machine.  Keyes did not see Dr. Breen or any other medical professional 
again after this appointment; he claimed the CPAP machine cured his sleep apnea.   
The District Court dismissed Keyes’s claims under the ADA and the PHRA that 
Don Guanella discriminated against him because of his sleep apnea, finding that Keyes 
neither presented direct evidence of disability discrimination nor was he able to establish 
a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the McDonnell-Douglas burden-
shifting framework.  The District Court also noted that even if Keyes were able to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Don Guanella proffered a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for Keyes’s termination that was not a pretext for discrimination.  
Keyes appeals this dismissal.   
We exercise de novo review over a district court’s grant of summary judgment.  
Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 2004).  To affirm, we must find that there is no 
                                              
5
 There is also a dispute between the parties as to whether Keyes was terminated 
or resigned.  We assume for the purposes of this appeal that Keyes suffered an adverse 
employment action.    
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genuine issue of material fact when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party.  Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995).  
However, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not 
defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.”  Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).  The party 
opposing summary judgment “must present more than just bare assertions, conclusory 
allegations or suspicions to show the existence of a genuine issue.”  Podobnik v. U.S. 
Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted).  To defeat a 
motion for summary judgment in a discrimination case, an employee must show either 
sufficient direct evidence or sufficient indirect evidence of discrimination.  Monaco v. 
Am. Gen. Assurance Co., 359 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2004).   
The parties agree that Keyes does not have any direct evidence that his supervisors 
at Don Guanella unlawfully discriminated against him.  Because he proceeds based on 
circumstantial evidence, he must put forth evidence that meets the McDonnell-Douglas 
requirements.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Monaco, 
359 F.3d at 300.  First, plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to make out a prima 
facie case of discrimination.  359 F.3d at 300.  If the plaintiff presents such evidence, the 
burden shifts to the employer to set forth a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its 
actions.  411 U.S. at 802.  If the employer prevails, the burden shifts back to plaintiff to 
produce evidence demonstrating that the defendant’s proffered reasons were merely a 
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pretext for discrimination.  Id. at 804.
6
  We agree with the District Court that Keyes fails 
the McDonnell-Douglas test at the first step; he cannot establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.  See Lawrence v. Nat’l Westminster 
Bank N.J., 98 F.3d 61, 66 n.3 (3d Cir. 1996).       
For a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, he 
must demonstrate that he is:  (1) disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) can 
perform the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable accommodations; 
and (3) has suffered an adverse employment action as a result of discrimination based on 
his disability.  Shaner v. Synthes, 204 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2000); Gaul v. Lucent Tech., 
Inc., 134 F.3d 576 (3d Cir. 1998).  A person qualifies as “disabled” under the ADA if he:  
(1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major 
life activities; (2) has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an 
impairment.  42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).    
The District Court was correct to conclude that Keyes fails to prove that his 
alleged “disability” fulfills any one of these elements.  First, Keyes’s sleep apnea did not 
substantially limit one or more of his major life activities.  Pointing to the sleep study he 
underwent after his termination from Don Guanella,
7
 Keyes claims that his apnea 
                                              
6
 Because we apply the same analysis to claims brought under the PHRA as we do 
to ADA claims, the arguments supporting dismissal of Keyes’s ADA claims are equally 
applicable to his PHRA claims.  See Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 382 (3d 
Cir. 2002).     
 
7
 Dr. Breen’s study noted that Keyes’s “sleep efficiency,” the percentage of one’s 
total time in bed spent sleeping, was 77.3% and that plaintiff had “severe sleep disordered 
breathing” as a result of his apnea.  The report also recommended that plaintiff sleep with 
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substantially limited his major life activities of breathing and sleeping.  Under the 
guidelines provided by the EEOC, we apply a two-step analysis to determine whether an 
individual is substantially limited in one or more major life activities.  Mondzelewski v. 
Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 783 (3d Cir. 1998).  First, we ask whether the 
individual is “substantially limited in any major life activity other than working, such as 
walking, seeing, or hearing,” by comparing the effect of the impairment on that 
individual with its effect on the average person in the general population.  Id. (citing 29 
C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j)).  If we find that the individual is not so limited, we 
then ask whether the individual is substantially limited in the major life activity of 
working.  Id.   
Here, the District Court properly found that the sleep study, combined with 
plaintiff’s testimony that he sometimes woke up “short of breath” and “gasping for air,” 
were insufficient to establish that Keyes’s sleep apnea substantially impaired his major 
life activity of breathing.  The EEOC regulations require courts determining whether a 
substantial limitation exists to consider the “nature and severity of the impairment,” the 
“duration or expected duration of the impairment,” and the actual or expected “permanent 
or long term impact” resulting from the impairment.  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2.  Keyes’s 
present assertion that his sleep apnea symptoms were severe is undermined by his delay 
in seeking medical care for his symptoms until six months after first noticing them and 
suspecting that he might be suffering from sleep apnea.  Further, there is no evidence that 
                                                                                                                                                  
a CPAP machine to relieve his sleep apnea symptoms.  Plaintiff testified that this 
machine cured his sleep apnea and allowed him to get restful sleep.  
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his breathing was impaired while he was at work, and plaintiff himself concedes that 
using the CPAP machine fully cured any nighttime impairment; indeed, after beginning 
to use the machine, he did not once return to a doctor regarding his sleep disorder.  We 
are thus not persuaded that the breathing impairment caused by his sleep apnea was of 
sufficient duration or severity to constitute a substantial limitation on his breathing.   
We also agree with the District Court’s conclusion that plaintiff’s sleep apnea did 
not impair his major life activity of sleeping.  Again, aside from the sleep study showing 
that plaintiff was asleep 77.3% of the time he was in bed and his testimony that he had 
trouble sleeping, there is little evidence that his sleep was severely disrupted.  Further, the 
CPAP machine fully cured his sleep issues.  Plaintiff’s reliance on Peter v. Lincoln Tech. 
Inst., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 417 (E.D. Pa. 2002), where the court found sufficient 
evidence that plaintiff’s sleep was substantially impaired by her sleep apnea, is 
misplaced.  There, plaintiff testified to waking up five to six times a night and falling 
asleep several times a day – including while she was transferring phone calls at work and 
driving to work.  Her disorder was unresponsive to a CPAP machine, tonsil surgery, oral 
medication and pure-oxygen therapy.  Id. at 434.  Keyes’s sleep disorder is not, as he 
depicts it, an “exact” analogue of the plaintiff in Peter’s disorder; the restrictions on 
Keyes’s sleep are mild by comparison and have proven to be easily remedied.  
 Having concluded that Keyes was not substantially limited in a major life activity 
other than working due to his sleep apnea, we ask whether his sleep apnea substantially 
limited his ability to work.  To be substantially limited in the major life activity of 
working, “one must be precluded from more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a 
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particular job of choice.”  Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999).  
Plaintiff conceded in his testimony that his sleep apnea in no way affected his ability to 
perform his duties at Don Guanella and that he excelled at his job.  Thus, we agree with 
the District Court that plaintiff’s sleep apnea substantially limited neither his ability to  
work nor perform any other major life activities.   
Second, Keyes fails to establish that he had a record of any condition that would 
be considered a disability under the ADA.  See Tice v. Centre Area Transp. Auth., 247 
F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 2001).  Finally, he cannot show that he was “regarded as” having a 
disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C), which requires plaintiff to establish that he had 
a nonlimiting impairment that defendants mistakenly believed substantially limited a 
major life activity.  Id. at 514; Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.  Even if, viewing the facts in the 
light most favorable to Keyes, we assume that Keyes did discuss his sleep apnea with his 
supervisors, see supra n.3, their mere awareness of his impairment is “insufficient to 
demonstrate either that the employer[s] regarded [Keyes] as disabled or that that 
perception caused the adverse employment action.”  Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 
109 (3d Cir. 1996).  To prevail in his “regarded as disabled” argument, plaintiff would 
have to show that his employer misinterpreted information about his limitations to 
conclude that he was unable to perform a “wide range or class of jobs.”  Williams v. 
Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 757 (3d Cir. 2004).  See Taylor v. 
Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 192 (3d Cir. 1999) (“An employer who simply, and 
erroneously, believes that a person is incapable of performing a particular job will not be 
liable under the ADA.”) (emphasis added).   Plaintiff’s speculative perception that his 
 10 
 
supervisors changed their attitude towards him when they heard about his sleep apnea, for 
proof of which he points to his supervisors’ “non-verbal reactions,” in no way proves that 
his supervisors viewed him as unable to perform a wide range of work.  The District 
Court properly found that plaintiff did not meet this bar.   
Since we have decided that plaintiff has failed to prove he was “disabled” under 
the ADA or the PHRA, we need proceed no further in the McDonnell-Douglas analysis.
8
  
Due to his failure to prove a disability, Keyes cannot make out a prima facie case of 
discrimination under the ADA.  Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment to defendant.  
 
                                              
8
 We note that the District Court was correct in concluding that, even if Keyes 
could somehow establish a prima facie case of discrimination, defendants could likely 
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Keyes’s termination that was not a 
pretext for discrimination.  Shortly before his termination, Keyes told his supervisors that 
his heart was no longer in his work.  Such a statement, from someone whose job it is to 
take care of special needs’ patients, may give an employer legitimate grounds to 
terminate the employee.  Finally, we agree with the District Court that plaintiff does not 
meet the heavy burden of establishing that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
proffered by defendant was pretextual.  See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764-65 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (holding that, to establish pretext, a plaintiff must point to some evidence from 
which a reasonable factfinder could either:  (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated 
legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely 
than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s action).  Plaintiff does not 
put forward sufficient “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or 
contradictions,” id. at 765, in defendant’s proffered legitimate reason that a rational 
factfinder would find that reason unworthy of credence.  Keyes’s attempt to establish 
pretext fails.  
